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Abstract
The Bank of Canada (BoC) activated its Contingent Term Repo Facility (CTRF) from April
2020 to April 2021 in response to liquidity strains in markets that stemmed from economic
uncertainty and the COVID-19 pandemic. The facility complemented other BoC liquidity
facilities by broadening access to the central bank’s repurchase (repo) operations beyond
primary dealers and their affiliates, to large asset managers active in Canadian dollar money
markets or fixed income markets. The CTRF offered one-month term funding to eligible
counterparties on a bilateral basis against securities issued or guaranteed by the
government of Canada or a provincial government. In the second quarter of 2020, the BoC
lent CAD 291.8 million (USD 223 million) through the CTRF. BoC officials said the facility was
“little used” because funding market conditions improved rapidly, and the facility’s pricing
and terms meant “regular market sources of funding became more favorable.” Officials from
large pension funds, which play a major role in Canadian repo markets, reported that though
they accessed the CTRF for lower amounts, it helped restore their confidence by providing
backstop repo rates, “[alleviating] some of the need to build up precautionary liquidity.”
Keywords: Bank of Canada, Canada, Contingent Term Repo Facility, CTRF

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based emergency lending programs. Cases are available from the Journal of
Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/.
2 Research Associate, New Bagehot Project, YPFS, Yale School of Management.
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Overview
The Canadian government, in line with other
countries, imposed lockdowns and travel
restrictions in March 2020 in response to the
spread of COVID-19, triggering significant
stress on its financial system and the broader
economy. While businesses and households
needed loans to manage income losses
stemming from stay-at-home orders, asset
managers needed to sell assets to handle fund
outflows and potential margin calls, as well as
manage exposure to volatility (Fontaine et al.
2021, 7).
Asset managers overall were net sellers of
bonds during the crisis. Some mutual funds
confronted redemptions by businesses and
households
facing
uncertainty,
and
consequently, needed to quickly sell lessliquid assets if they depleted their buffers of
cash and easily sold assets. Some pension
funds sold assets to meet margin calls, and
some leveraged funds sold assets to
rebalance their portfolios to manage riskier
products that could have been negatively
impacted by the lockdowns (Fontaine et al.
2021, 5–7).
The concurrent demand for cash via asset
sales and borrowing strained banks. “The
proportion of [banks’] balance sheet
expansion suggest banks faced a trade-off
between lending to the real economy and
purchases of securities (or lending against
bond collateral),” and it would be easier for
the banks to limit resources for new
securities purchases (Fontaine et al. 2021,
18). The reliance on banks “made them a
bottleneck that impeded the flow of
securities among investors in financial
markets” (Fontaine et al. 2021, 19). The Bank
of Canada (BoC) stated in its annual Financial
System Review that “[l]iquidity strains were
widespread across financial markets in
March” (BoC 2020g).
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Key Terms
Purpose: “To counter any severe market-wide
liquidity stresses and support the stability of the
Canadian financial system”
Launch Dates

Announced:
March 20, 2020
Activated: April 6, 2020

Expiration Date

April 6, 2021

Legal Authority

Subparagraph 18(g)(i)
of the Bank of Canada
Act

Peak Outstanding

CAD 291.8 million of
securities in Q2 2020

Participants

Financial institutions
subject to federal or
provincial regulation
that could prove
significant activity in
Canadian money or
bond markets

Rate

Connected to the
overnight swap index
rate

Collateral

Securities issued or
guaranteed by the
government of Canada
or a provincial
government

Loan Duration

One month

Notable Features

Similar to a Global
Financial Crisis–era
program

Outcomes

CAD 291.8 million of
securities from
counterparties in Q2
2020
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In response, the BoC implemented multiple programs to ensure that Canadian financial
institutions had access to liquidity that could then be used to support credit needs in the
broader economy (Poloz 2020).3 This included the Contingent Term Repo Facility (CTRF),
which provided a broader set of financial institutions access to term repurchase agreements
(repos) against a wide range of securities issued or guaranteed by the government of Canada
or a provincial government (BoC 2020e; Gravelle 2021, 3). 4 The BoC typically engages only
with primary dealers for term repos (BoC 2021c).
The CTRF offered funding on a one-month term to counterparties that could prove
“significant activity” in Canadian dollar markets or fixed income markets (BoC 2020b). The
BoC could have conducted the repos on shorter terms at the central bank’s discretion, but it
is unknown if and how often it did so because the BoC reported its CTRF transactions only
on an aggregate basis weekly and monthly. Collateral used in CTRF repos were subject to the
same haircuts as eligible collateral in the BoC’s Standing Liquidity Facility, which provided
overnight advances to certain financial institutions that participate in Canada’s main
payments system (BoC 2020b; BoC 2021c).5
The central bank conducted the transactions on a bilateral basis through the securities
settlement system CDSX (BoC 2020b). The BoC did not announce a program size limit for the
CTRF.
The BoC’s financial statement for the second quarter of 2020 shows that the central bank
purchased CAD 291.8 million (USD 223 million) worth of securities through the CTRF (BoC
2020i, 23).6 Exact utilization figures are unavailable after the second quarter because the
BoC did not continue to break out CTRF purchase data in its subsequent quarterly financial
statements. The BoC stated on its CTRF website that it would report such transactions at an
aggregate level, along with its other repo operations, in its weekly balance sheet updates
(BoC 2020b).
Still, in a chapter written for a Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) book, BoC Deputy
Governor Toni Gravelle and former BoC Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn Wilkins said the
facility was “little used” (Gravelle, Wilkins, and Ubide 2021, 66). Similarly, BoC researchers
found that Canada’s largest pension funds, which play a major role in the country’s repo
markets (Garriott and Gray 2016, 11), did access the CTRF but not in large amounts (BédardPagé et al. 2021, 8–9).
Summary Evaluation
Little research has been done regarding the CTRF’s effectiveness, most likely because
financial institutions did not tap it substantially. Even so, a measure the BoC used in 2020
See Key Design Decision No. 3, Part of a Package, for a longer list of BoC interventions.
The CTRF was modeled after a similar temporary term repo facility the BoC established during the Global
Financial Crisis (Wilkins 2015, 5). See Key Design Decision No. 2, Legal Authority, for further discussion of the
two CTRF programs.
5 See the Key Design Decision No. 11, Eligible Collateral, for further discussion of the Standing Liquidity Facility.
6 Per Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Rate data, USD 1 = CAD 1.30 on December 31, 2019.
3
4

710

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

called the price-impact proxy, which measures the temporary impact of a trade on the price
of a bond, showed a spike in illiquidity at the start of the pandemic followed by a rapid drop
after the bank’s interventions, including the CTRF’s introduction (BoC 2020g).
Representatives from some of Canada’s pension funds told BoC researchers that the CTRF
helped to restore their confidence by providing backstop repo rates, alleviating “some of the
need to build up precautionary liquidity” (Bédard-Pagé et al. 2021, 8–9).
The CTRF was not widely or deeply tapped because funding market conditions improved
rapidly, and the facility’s pricing and terms meant “regular market sources of funding
became more favorable” (Gravelle, Wilkins, and Ubide 2021, 66). The CTRF was meant to
complement the BoC’s enhanced regular term repo facility. Market participants more
actively used this enhanced regular term repo facility because banks and their brokerdealers, eligible for the regular repo facility, were and are central to the dispersion of funding
and market liquidity in Canadian core fixed-income markets (Gravelle, Wilkins, and Ubide
2021, 66). They were the “best placed” to pass along funding received from the BoC (Gravelle,
Wilkins, and Ubide 2021, 66).
Jeremy Kronick, a former BoC economist, argued that because the CTRF was a non-auction
facility, it didn’t guarantee competitive pricing and “optimal” liquidity distribution
(Andolfatto, Nelson, and Kronick 2020).
BoC researchers highlighted moral hazard concerns that could arise if the central bank
continued to engage directly with asset managers and other non-traditional counterparties
via facilities like the CTRF and suggested that the BoC consider a variety of measures to
reduce moral hazard (Fontaine et al. 2021, 28–30). One such policy change includes giving
some asset managers deposit accounts of their own at the central bank, allowing the asset
managers the “option to hold a safe asset that can be used as money in all weather,
irrespective of bank dealers’ risk limits” (Fontaine et al. 2021, 28–30). The BoC could also
consider normalizing access to its operations to large investors that hold targeted securities
(Fontaine et al. 2021, 28–30).
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Context: Canada 2019–2020
GDP
$1.8 trillion in 2019
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
$1.8 trillion in 2020
converted to USD)
GDP per capita
$46,327 in 2019
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU
$43,242 in 2020
converted to USD)
Data for 2019:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AAA
Sovereign credit rating
(five-year senior debt)
Data for 2020:
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
Fitch: AA+
Data not available for 2019
Size of banking system
Data not available for 2020
Size of banking system
Data not available for 2019
as a percentage of GDP
Data not available for 2020
Size of banking system
Data not available for 2019
as a percentage of financial system
Data not available for 2020
84.22% in 2019
Five-bank concentration of banking system
84.52% in 2020
Data not available for 2019
Foreign involvement in banking system
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available for 2020
Yes, in 2019
Existence of deposit insurance
Yes, in 2020
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Bank of Canada activated the Contingent Term Repo Facility to
“counter any severe market-wide liquidity stresses and support the stability of the
Canadian financial system” by offering backstop repo rates and by providing a
broader set of financial institutions access to term repurchase agreements.
The Bank of Canada (BoC) in early April announced that it would initiate its Contingent Term
Repo Facility (CTRF) to “counter any severe market-wide liquidity stresses and support the
stability of the Canadian financial system” (BoC 2020e; BoC 2021a). The CTRF broadened
the list of financial institutions that the BoC engaged with for its normal repurchase
agreement (repo) operations, providing access to large asset managers active in repo
markets (Gravelle 2021, 3). The BoC typically engages only with primary dealers during its
routine repo and reverse repo operations (BoC 2021c).
2. Legal Authority: Section 18(c) of the Bank of Canada Act provides the BoC
authority to buy and sell securities issued or guaranteed by the Canadian
government or by the country’s provinces.
The power is enumerated in the Powers and Business section of the Bank of Canada Act
(Bank of Canada Act 1985).
As part of the central bank’s efforts to learn from the fallout of the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC) and shore up its operating framework (BoC 2015b, 2), policymakers created the CTRF
in 2015 to deal with “severe market-wide liquidity stress” when activated and stated that
the facility would not be used to address “idiosyncratic liquidity shocks at individual
institutions” (BoC 2015c; BoC 2015a, 13).
The CTRF is modeled after a similar temporary term repo facility the BoC established during
the GFC (Wilkins 2015, 5; Sankar 2022). The BoC updated its Framework for Financial
Market Operations to create the CTRF, rather than changing its policy for buying and selling
securities (BoC 2015a; BoC 2015d; BoC 2008). This BoC policy, as adopted originally in 2008,
provides the central bank flexibility to offer liquidity to institutions beyond primary dealers
and their affiliates (BoC 2021c).
3. Part of a Package: The BoC activated the CTRF as part of a broader suite of liquidity
provision measures at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The BoC activated the CTRF as part of a broader suite of financial stabilization and liquidity
provision measures that the bank implemented in early 2020 in response to the COVID-19
pandemic. Other policies included the following (BoC 2020f, 14):
•

Lowering the target for the overnight rate by a cumulative 150 basis points to the
effective lower bound of 0.25 percent;
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•

Launching the Bankers’ Acceptance Purchase Facility;

•

Introducing a program to purchase Canada Mortgage Bonds in the secondary
market;

•

Introducing the Provincial Money Market Purchase Program;

•

Introducing the Commercial Paper Purchase Program;

•

Introducing the Corporate Bond Purchase Program;

•

Introducing the Provincial Bond Purchase Program;

•

Launching a program to purchase government of Canada securities in the secondary
market (minimum of CAD 5 billion per week, across the yield curve);

•

Enhancing term repo operations;

•

Coordinating with international policymakers for US-dollar liquidity and
announcing that a US dollar term repo facility would be made available on a
contingency basis (should the need arise);

•

Launching the Standing Term Liquidity Facility.

4. Management: The BoC implemented the program and utilized CDS Clearing and
Depository Services Inc. to settle transactions.
No other Canadian governmental agencies were involved in the CTRF’s implementation.
Counterparties had to deliver collateral to the BoC through security settlement system CDSX
(BoC 2020b). The system is owned and operated by CDS Clearing and Depository Services
Inc., which is in turn owned indirectly by the for-profit corporation TMX Group (BoC 2020b;
BoC 2021b).
The Bank of Canada Act requires that the central bank publish financial information about
its assets and liabilities every week on its website. The BoC is also required to release audited
financial statements and a report by the BoC’s governor to the Minister of Finance (Bank of
Canada Act 1985).
5. Administration: The CTRF was a bilateral facility open for continuous access.
The BoC transacted directly with counterparties (BoC 2020b). Eligible parties could access
the facility as needed (BoC 2015a, 14), a design feature intended to restore confidence by
“providing backstop repo rates” (Bédard-Pagé et al. 2021, 9). By 3 pm EST on settlement day,
counterparties had to deliver securities acting as collateral to the BoC through the security
settlement system CDSX (BoC 2020b).
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6. Eligible Participants: Financial institutions subject to federal or provincial
regulation that could prove significant activity in Canadian money or bond
markets could access the CTRF, a departure from the BoC’s regular practice of
engaging only with primary dealers for term repos.
Institutions seeking access to the CTRF had to provide information describing their
involvement in Canadian money and bond markets and identify the relevant regulator and
the regulations that applied to the firm. The BoC also asked applicants for the following
information (BoC 2020a):
•

Size of Canadian fixed-income and money market assets under management;

•

Number of counterparties transacted with on a regular basis;

•

Breakdown of the amount of eligible securities based on the current terms and
conditions that was available to be used at the Bank of Canada, including
approximate market value;

•

Average daily trading volumes of Canadian fixed-income and money market
products in 2019 broken down by product type;

•

Rationale for accessing the CTRF (e.g., testing, liquidity, loss of market access).

Institutions were also required to deliver the relevant securities through CDSX or have a
“custodial relationship in place” to do so (BoC 2020a).
The BoC used the CTRF to provide a broader set of financial institutions access to term repos
(Gravelle 2021, 3). BoC researchers found that Canada’s largest pension funds play a major
role in the country’s repo markets (Bédard-Pagé et al. 2021, 8–9; Garriott and Gray 2016,
11).
7. Funding Source: The BoC expanded its balance sheet to purchase eligible
securities.
The stabilization measures launched by the BoC rapidly expanded the BoC’s balance sheet
during the worst part of the pandemic in 2020, from March to June, leaving the central bank’s
ledger at historic highs. The CTRF accounted for a very small fraction of this expansion (see
Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Bank of Canada’s Total Assets
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Source: BoC 2022.

8. Program Size: The BoC did not announce a CTRF size limit. It lent just CAD 291.8
million through the program during the first quarter of its operation, a small
fraction of the BoC’s broader repo operations.
Policy documents that detailed the CTRF’s official establishment in 2015 do not state that
the BoC would announce such a limit if it chose to activate the CTRF (BoC 2015a, 13–14).
Exact utilization figures are unavailable after the second quarter of 2020 because the BoC
did not continue to break out CTRF data in its subsequent quarterly financial statements. The
BoC stated on its CTRF website that it would instead report such transactions at an aggregate
level, along with its other repo operations, in its weekly balance sheet (BoC 2020b; BoC
2020i, 23). Two representatives of the BoC stated in a report about the central bank’s
interventions that the facility was “little used” (Gravelle, Wilkins, and Ubide 2021, 66).
As of November 2021, the BoC had not formally published the names of institutions that
accessed the CTRF. However, BoC researchers’ interviews conducted with Canada’s largest
pension funds, the so-called “Big Eight,” revealed that they did tap the facility, albeit in small
amounts (Bédard-Pagé et al. 2021, 8–9).7
The Big Eight include the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec,
the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, the British Columbia Investment Management Corporation, the Public
Sector Pension Investment Board, the Alberta Investment Management Corporation, the Ontario Municipal
Employees Retirement System, and the Healthcare of Ontario Pension Plan (Bédard-Pagé et al. 2021, 1).
7
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The BoC’s presence in broader repo markets—through the CTRF and regular term repo
facility—increased substantially at the height of the pandemic, peaking at CAD 211 billion in
June 2020. This was the most the BoC had ever participated in the repo market, more than
quintupling the previous peak at the height of the GFC in 2008 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Total Securities Purchased Under Resale Agreement

Source: BoC 2022.

9. Individual Participation Limits: The BoC did not announce individual
participation limits.
The BoC’s CTRF policy documents do not include language limiting the amount of funds an
individual institution could receive as part of repo transactions.
10. Rate Charged: The CTRF charged a fixed rate, calculated in part using the relevant
overnight index swap rate.
Officials calculated the CTRF’s repo rate, an interest-like charge the counterparty pays on top
of the price of the asset it originally agreed to repurchase, in the following manner (BoC
2020b).
The rate was the overnight index swap (OIS) rate of the maturity of the operation plus the
higher of (1) 35 basis points, (2) the highest spread over the OIS rate on the most recent term
repo with the closest tenor, or (3) as otherwise determined by the BoC at the time of the
transaction. The BoC calculated the interest on an actual 365-day basis (BoC 2020b).
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11. Eligible Collateral: The CTRF offered liquidity against securities issued or
guaranteed by the government of Canada or a provincial government.
During its normal operations, the BoC generally limits the type of financial assets it acquires
to public-issued or guaranteed assets to manage risk to its balance sheet, though it does
maintain the right to purchase assets associated with a higher degree of risk (BoC 2021d).
Policymakers likely used the bank’s typical asset acquisition and management standards to
create requirements for the CTRF, though the rationale was not explicitly stated in public
CTRF documentation. Eligible securities included the following (BoC 2020b):
•

Securities issued by the government of Canada;

•

Government of Canada stripped coupons and residuals;

•

Securities guaranteed by the government of Canada (including Canada Mortgage
Bonds and NHA mortgage-backed securities with a minimum pool size of CAD 25
million);

•

Government of Canada-guaranteed stripped coupons and residuals;

•

Securities issued or guaranteed by a provincial government that met the criterion of
sufficiently high quality as determined by the BoC;

•

Stripped coupons and residuals of securities issued or guaranteed by a provincial
government that met the criterion of sufficiently high quality as determined by the
BoC.

With the BoC’s approval, institutions could substitute a limited number of securities
underlying the repo, but the transaction and the substitution date must have been prearranged. Unless otherwise arranged, eligible counterparties had one substitution window
per operation (BoC 2020b).
Securities eligible for the CTRF were subject to the same haircut and margin requirements
as those for the BoC’s Standing Liquidity Facility (SLF). The BoC’s SLF provided overnight
advances to financial institutions that were members of the Large Value Transfer System
(LVTS), Canada’s main payments network. Members are required to meet certain settlement
balance levels each night and may tap the SLF if the financial institution is unable to do so
because of temporary liquidity shortages (BoC 2021c). As of April 9, 2020, the SLF, and by
extension, the CTRF, utilized the margin schedule shown in Figure 3.8

Central bank policymakers often deduct so-called haircuts or margins from the market value of pledged
collateral. By devaluing an asset relative to its perceived riskiness (larger margins for higher risk), the central
bank attempts to protect itself from a drop in the collateral’s price (Chailloux, Gray, and McCaughrin 2008, 22–
23).
8
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Figure 3: Margin Requirements for Assets Eligible as Collateral Under the BoC’s SLF
and CTRF
Collateral type

Remaining Maturity
up to 3
months

>3-12
months

>1-3
years

>3-5
years

>5-10
years

>10-35
years

>35
years

Securities issued by the government of
Canada

0.25%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

3.00%

3.50%

Government of Canada stripped
coupons and residuals

0.25%

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

4.00% 11.50%

Securities guaranteed by the
Government of Canada (excluding NHA
mortgage-backed securities)

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

4.00%

4.50%

NHA mortgage-backed securities

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

5.00%

5.50%

Government of Canada guaranteed
stripped coupons and residuals

0.50%

1.00%

1.50%

2.50%

4.00%

5.50% 13.00%

Securities issued by a provincial
government

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

4.00%

Provincial government stripped
coupons and residuals

1.00%

1.50%

2.00%

3.00%

4.50%

6.00% 17.00%

Other public sector

1.00%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

4.50%

6.50%

Securities guaranteed by a provincial
government

1.00%

2.00%

2.50%

3.00%

3.50%

4.50%

6.50%

Provincial government guaranteed
stripped coupons and residuals

1.00%

2.00%

2.50%

3.50%

5.00%

6.50% 17.50%

6.00%

Source: BoC 2020b; BoC 2020c.

12. Loan Duration: CTRF transactions carried a term of one month.
Repos through the CTRF carried a one-month term. Eligible counterparties accessing the
CTRF could also use the facility for repo transactions with a term of less than one month at
the participant’s discretion. The BoC reserved the right to allow longer-term transactions but
did not publish a market notice announcing such a change (BoC 2020b).
A breakdown of CTRF use based on term length was not available in the BoC’s published
documentation and data.
13. Other Conditions: The BoC did not impose restrictions or requirements on eligible
counterparties.
Still, the BoC reserved the right to sanction eligible counterparties for failing to meet general
contract terms, such as returning the required cash on the maturity date. Sanctions could
include suspension of CTRF access and restricted access to the central bank’s regular Term
Repo Operations. The BoC could also change, on a temporary basis, a sanctioned
counterparty’s bidding limit for its regular Term Repo Operations (BoC 2020b).
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14. Impact on Monetary Policy Transmission: The BoC did not discuss the impact of
the CTRF on monetary policy transmission.
The BoC did not discuss monetary policy transmission issues in its CTRF documentation.
15. Other Options: There is no publicly available information on other options
considered by the BoC.
There is no publicly available information on other options considered by the BoC.
16. Similar Programs in Other Countries: The Bank of England activated a Contingent
Term Repo Facility that was similar in purpose to the BoC’s program.
The Bank of England (BoE) activated its CTRF in March 2020 as a liquidity “insurance”
facility, but there is no evidence to suggest that the BoC designed its CTRF with the BoE’s in
mind (BoE 2020; Fulmer 2022).
17. Communication: Policymakers described the CTRF as a facility that would allow a
broader variety of financial institutions to access the BoC’s repo operations.
To address “severe” liquidity issues that affected Canadian markets in March 2020, the BoC
injected “significant” amounts of new funding into the financial system by escalating its repo
operations (Gravelle 2021, 2; BoC 2020d). This was, and is, the central bank’s primary tool
to jumpstart funding markets experiencing liquidity issues (Gravelle 2021, 3; BoC 2021c).
Policymakers positioned the CTRF as an additional tool the BOC could use to broaden access
to its key repo operations.9 For example, Deputy BoC Governor Toni Gravelle stated that the
CTRF provided liquidity to large asset managers that were active in repo markets, rather
than just primary dealers, the counterparties with which the BoC typically engages in repos
(Gravelle 2021, 3).
18. Disclosure: The BoC reported aggregated CTRF transactions weekly.
The Bank of Canada Act requires that the central bank publish financial information about
its assets and liabilities every week on its website (Bank of Canada Act 1985). The BoC
reported CTRF transactions at an aggregate level with other securities purchased under
resale agreements (BoC 2020b). The central bank briefly, in the second quarter of 2020,
broke out CTRF figures but ceased doing so after (BoC 2020i, 23). The BoC is also required
to release audited financial statements and a report by the BoC’s governor to the Minister of
Finance (Bank of Canada Act 1985).

See the BoC’s 2020 quarterly reports and its 2020 annual report (BoC 2020d; BoC 2020h; BoC 2020i; BoC
2020j; BoC 2021f; BoC 2021g).
9

720

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 2

19. Stigma Strategy: The BoC did not publish the names of participating institutions.
Because of confidentiality considerations, the BoC chose not to publish the names of
individual institutions (BoC 2020b). Respondents to the BoC’s 2015 request for comment
about the CTRF’s initial establishment worried that institutions accessing the facility might
face negative stigma (BoC 2015c). When announcing the establishment of the CTRF, the BoC
stated it would mitigate those disclosure concerns if the facility were activated in the future
(BoC 2015c).
20. Exit Strategy: The BoC ended CTRF operations, as initially scheduled, on April 6,
2021.
The BoC activated the CTRF on April 6, 2020, and said the facility would operate for 12
months (BoC 2020e). The central bank shuttered the CTRF, as originally scheduled, on April
6, 2021 (BoC 2021e). The BoC on its balance sheet does not distinguish between securities
held under the CTRF from securities held under its other repo operations. Officials have said
there was little usage after the second quarter of 2020 (BoC 2020b).
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